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ABSTRACT: I addresses a puzzle about one of Francis Hutcheson’s objections to 
psychological egoism. The puzzle concerns his premise that God receives no benefit 
from rewarding the virtuous. Why, in the early editions of his Inquiry Concerning 
Virtue (1725, 1726), does Hutcheson leave this premise undefended? And why, in the 
later editions (1729, 1738), does he continue to do so, knowing that in 1726 John 
Clarke of Hull had subjected the premise to plausible criticism, geared to the very 
audience (mainly Christian) for whom Hutcheson’s objection to egoism was written? 
This puzzle is not negligible. Some might claim that Hutcheson ruins his objection by 
ignoring Clarke’s criticism. To answer the puzzle we must consider not only 
Hutcheson’s philosophy, but also some theological assumptions of Hutcheson’s time. 
 
1. 
Often, we can answer a puzzle about a philosophical text only by looking 
beyond the text itself and even beyond the philosophical context in which it 
was written. We must look at the wider intellectual context of its time—for 
instance, at assumptions in theology.  
A puzzle of this kind arises from the debate between Francis Hutcheson 
(1694–1746) and John Clarke of Hull (1687–1734) over the relation between 
desire and self-interest. In particular, it arises from a passage in Hutcheson’s 
Inquiry Concerning Virtue, especially if we read a related passage in Clarke’s 
Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice.1 These works are well known 
to students of the British moralists; so I suspect that others besides me have 
considered the puzzle. However, to my knowledge no one has answered the 
puzzle or even discussed it in print, despite the historical and philosophical 
importance of Hutcheson’s Inquiry. The puzzle merits attention for these 
reasons. A further reason, already indicated, is that to examine the puzzle is to 
highlight the importance of intellectual context to questions in the history of 
philosophy.  
                                                                  
1 The first of these two titles is short for An Inquiry Concerning the Original of our Ideas of Virtue or 
Moral Good (hereafter Inquiry, for short), the second of the two essays in Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry 
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A full explanation of the puzzle requires background material, which I 
provide in section 2. But let me say here that the puzzle concerns one of 
Hutcheson’s objections to psychological egoism. Although Hutcheson intends 
that objection for a Christian audience, one of its premises not only invites, but 
receives from John Clarke, a challenge of a Christian kind. Also, in the later 
editions of his Inquiry Hutcheson is well aware of that challenge. Why, then, 
does Hutcheson advance his premise without argument, not only in the early 
editions of his Inquiry but in the editions following Clarke’s challenge? Why 
does he make no reply to the Christian challenge Clarke issues, while contin-
uing to expect Christians to accept the argument Clarke challenges? This is the 
puzzle I address. 
2. 
In this section I provide background material; in the next section I explain the 
puzzle. In section 4 I address a possibly tempting, but defective, answer to the 
puzzle. In section 5 I give my own answer, and in section 6 I address a question 
my answer may raise. 
In the first section of his Inquiry (each edition), Hutcheson argues that we 
have a moral sense through which we feel approval for certain deeds, namely, 
those that appear to spring from fundamental, benevolent desires.2 By a funda-
mental desire I mean a desire we possess insofar as we want something for its 
own sake, not simply as a means to something else. By a benevolent desire I 
mean a desire for the happiness (good, well-being) of one or more people 
besides the agent, the “agent” being the person who has the desire. In 
Hutcheson’s view, when we perceive an act to flow from a fundamental desire 
for the happiness of others, we automatically feel moral approval of the act, 
owing to our moral sense.   
This view of Hutcheson’s invites a question: do we really have fundamen-
tal benevolent desires? Do we ever want the happiness of others for its own 
sake, not merely as a means to something else? To answer no, and to hold 
further that every fundamental human desire aims only at a benefit to the 
agent—for instance, at the agent’s own happiness or survival—is to hold the 
thesis of psychological egoism. This thesis was a major source of debate among 
British philosophers of the eighteenth century, with Clarke and Hutcheson 
among the key contributors.3 That Hutcheson would contribute to the debate is 
                                                                  
2 IBV2 117-35. See also IBV2 116, 162, 224; IBV3 110-130, 151. 
3 Excerpts from many of the contributions are in D. H. Monro, ed., A Guide to the British Moralists 
(London UK: Collins, 1972). A useful discussion of the debate is Christian Maurer, “Self-Interest and 
Sociability” in James A. Harris, ed., The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth 
Century (Oxford UK: Oxford Univ. Press , 2013 ), pp. 291-314. An excellent introduction to psychological 
egoism is Joshua May, “Psychological Egoism,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. James Fieser 
and Bradley Dowden, ISSN 2161-0002, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/psychego/>, 2011. 
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no surprise, for psychological egoism conflicts with his presupposition that 
some deeds spring from fundamental benevolent desires. Predictably, in section 
2 of his Inquiry he advances many objections to psychological egoism.4 
Most of Hutcheson’s objections appeal to introspection or ordinary experi-
ence.5 One of them, however, employs theological assumptions.6 Hutcheson 
improved the objection slightly in revising his Inquiry for the third edition; so 
let me quote the objection from that edition:7 
Had we no other ultimate Desire but that of private Advantage, we must imagine 
that every rational Being acts only for its own Advantage; and however we may 
call a beneficent Being a good Being, because it acts for our Advantage, yet upon 
this Scheme we should not be apt to think there is any beneficent Being in Nature, 
or a Being who acts for the Good of others. Particularly, If there is no Sense of 
Excellence in publick Love, and promoting the Happiness of others, whence 
should this Persuasion arise, “That the Deity will make the Virtuous happy?” Can 
we prove that it is for the Advantage of the Deity to do so? This I fansy will be 
look’d upon as very absurd, by many who yet expect Mercy and Beneficence in 
the Deity. And if there be such Dispositions in the Deity, where is the impossi-
bility of some small degree of this publick Love in his Creatures? And why must 
                                                                  
4 IBV2 136-61, especially 146-61; IBV3 131-64, especially 137-64. 
5 Useful discussions of them include Henning Jensen, Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis 
Hutcheson’s Ethical Theory (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 13-19; Robert M. Stewart, “John Clarke and 
Francis Hutcheson on Self-Love and Moral Motivation,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 20 (1982): 
261-77; Mark Strasser, Francis Hutcheson’s Moral Theory: Its Form and Utility (Wakefield NH: 
Longwood Academic, 1990), ch. 4; Thomas Mautner, “Introduction” in Thomas Mautner, ed., Francis 
Hutcheson: Two Texts on Human Nature (Cambridge UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 1-87, at pp. 
33-47; Michael B. Gill, The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics 
(Cambridge UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006), pp. 141-50; and Terence Cuneo, “Reason and the 
Passions” in Harris, pp. 226-47, at pp. 227-29.  
6 A brief account of this objection is in Cuneo, p. 229. See also John J. Tilley, “Hutcheson’s 
Theological Objection to Egoism,” Journal of Scottish Philosophy 14 (2016): 101-123.  
7 The main difference between the objection as it appears in the third edition and the objection as it 
appears in the second is that in the latter, instead of the sentence, “This I fansy will be look’d upon as very 
absurd, by many who yet expect Mercy and Beneficence in the Deity,” we find this: “This I fancy will be 
look’d upon as very absurd, unless we suppose some beneficent Dispositions essential to the Deity, which 
determine him to consult the publick Good of his Creatures, and reward such as co-operate with his kind 
Intention” (IBV2 150). This difference is immaterial if, in the latter sentence, the word “Advantage” has 
an especially broad meaning or the word “this” refers, not to the thought that “it is for the Advantage of 
the Deity to [make the virtuous happy],” but to the slightly earlier thought that “the Deity will make the 
Virtuous happy.” Otherwise a problem occurs, which is that the sentence seems to suggest that as long as 
the deity has some beneficent dispositions, he benefits himself—receives pleasure or happiness—by 
making the virtuous happy. This suggestion is unwanted because one of the points of Hutcheson’s 
objection is that regardless of what desires the deity has, the deity does not benefit himself by making us 
happy (his “Interests are independent on us”). This point is crucial to Hutcheson’s claim that, to explain 
why the deity does in fact make us happy, we must suppose that he has “some other Principle of Action ... 
than Self-Love.” It is thus no surprise that Hutcheson revised the problematic sentence in the third edition 
of the Inquiry.  
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they be suppos’d incapable of acting but from Self-Love?  
        In short, without acknowledging some other Principle of Action in rational 
Agents than Self-Love, I see no Foundation to expect Beneficence, or Rewards 
from God, or Man, farther than it is the Interest of the Benefactor; and all Expec-
tation of Benefits from a Being whose Interests are independent on us, must be 
perfectly ridiculous. What should engage the Deity to reward Virtue? (IBV3 156-
57.) 
If we wish to reconstruct this argument step by step, there is room for 
disagreement about how best to do so. However, since every viable reconstruc-
tion will include the premise I plan to discuss, allow me to be brief on this 
matter by saying the following. First, I take the core of the argument to be in 
the first paragraph—in the portion starting with “Particularly.” (The earlier 
portion, I believe, is introductory material that Hutcheson fleshes out in the 
later portion; and the two sentences following that portion, those beginning 
with “In short,” summarize key points of the objection.) Second, I see the 
argument as having two targets. One of them is psychological egoism; the other 
is evaluative egoism, the view that we can fundamentally value, consider good 
for its own sake, nothing but benefits to ourselves. Third, the following is a fair 
reconstruction of the part of the argument concerned with psychological 
egoism:8 
Although God rewards the virtuous, God does not benefit himself by doing 
so. It is not “for the Advantage of the Deity to do so”; his “Interests are 
independent on us.” Thus, it is reasonable to think that God rewards the 
virtuous out of a fundamental desire for their happiness—that is, God 
makes the virtuous happy because he desires their happiness for its own 
sake.9 Furthermore, if it is reasonable to think that God has fundamental 
desires for the happiness of others, it is reasonable to think that we humans 
are capable of such desires. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that humans 
are capable of fundamental desires for the happiness of others, and hence 
that psychological egoism is false.  
Let us call this argument Hutcheson’s theological objection—meaning his 
theological objection to psychological egoism. It contains much of interest; it 
also raises a puzzle. The puzzle concerns the following premise, which I call 
the no-benefit thesis, or NB: 
                                                                  
8 Were I to expand the reconstruction to reflect the part of the argument concerned with evaluative 
egoism, I would begin the paragraph with the sentence, “If evaluative egoism is true, in which case ‘there 
is no Sense of Excellence in publick Love ...,’ then God rewards the virtuous only if he benefits himself by 
doing so.” Also, following the clause “his ‘Interests are independent on us’” I would insert the interme-
diate conclusion (left implicit by Hutcheson) that evaluative egoism is false.  
9 Objection: perhaps God has a fundamental desire to do good, and rewarding the virtuous furthers 
that end. Although this objection may necessitate slight revisions to Hutcheson’s argument, the revised 
argument will be no less challenging to psychological egoism than the present one. 
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NB: God does not benefit himself by rewarding the virtuous. 
Let us note something before going on, namely, that NB does not imply that 
God receives nothing, not even the fulfilment of a desire, by rewarding the 
virtuous. By rewarding them he fulfils his desire to do. However, to fulfil a 
desire is merely to bring about the state of affairs the desire has as its object, 
whatever that may be. This is not necessarily to receive a benefit in any 
ordinary sense, such as pleasure or happiness. (Often, the fulfilment of a desire 
brings pleasure, but it does not do so necessarily.) The point of NB is that God 
receives no benefit of that kind by rewarding the virtuous. 
Although NB may spawn no puzzle on a first reading, it does so when we 
read John Clarke’s replies to Hutcheson’s case against egoism. Although those 
replies aim explicitly at the second edition of Hutcheson’s Inquiry, Hutcheson’s 
theological objection in that edition is basically the same as the version I 
quoted. It thus relies on NB, Clarke’s reply to which is of interest for this paper.  
Before I present that reply, let me say a few words about Clarke and his 
relation to Hutcheson. Clarke was a classical scholar, educational reformer, 
and, for many years, master of the Hull grammar school. He was also a moral 
theorist who, in his Foundation, attacked the moral sentimentalism of 
Hutcheson and the moral rationalism of Samuel Clarke (1675–1729).10 Along 
the way he developed his own moral theory, which tries to harmonize theologi-
cal voluntarism, ethical egoism, and the view that morality concerns the general 
good.11 Details of this theory need not concern us, except to say that among 
Clarke’s premises was the view that humans can fundamentally desire nothing 
but their own pleasure (to include the absence of pain).12 This view is a brand 
of psychological egoism; hence, not surprisingly, Hutcheson’s objections to 
psychological egoism receive criticism in Clarke’s Foundation.13  
Hutcheson was well aware of Clarke’s criticisms. In fact, in his Essay on 
the Passions (1728) and in the third edition of his Inquiry (1729) he wrote the 
parts on psychological egoism with Clarke’s Foundation keenly in mind.14 
Consider this remark from Hutcheson’s Essay (p. xii): 
                                                                  
10 Clarke’s Foundation divides into two parts. Pages 3 through 40 criticize Samuel Clarke’s moral 
theory; pages 41 through 112 criticize Hutcheson’s. 
11 Clarke, pp. 8-25, 31-32, 35-38, 39-40, 49, 64, 69-70, 105-106. Theological volunteerism asserts, 
roughly, that an act is morally right if and only if it comports with God’s will. Ethical egoism asserts, 
roughly, that an act is morally right if and only if it best serves the interests of the agent.  
12 Clarke, pp. 25-27, 53-57, 63-64. 
13 Clarke, pp. 78-97, 101-104. 
14 The first of the titles mentioned here is short for An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the 
Passions (hereafter Essay, for short), the first of the two essays in Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the 
Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With Illustrations On the Moral Sense (London UK: 
J. Darby and T. Browne, 1728). For valuable material on how Clarke’s Foundation influenced 
Hutcheson’s Essay and the third edition of Hutcheson’s Inquiry, see Luigi Turco, “Sympathy and Moral 
Sense: 1725–1740,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1999): 79-101, at 82-89.  
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The principal Objections offer’d by Mr. Clarke of Hull, against the second 
Section of the second Treatise [i.e., against section 2 of Hutcheson’s Inquiry], 
occurr’d to the Author [Hutcheson] in Conversation, and had appriz’d him of the 
necessity of a farther illustration of disinterested Affections, in answer to his 
[Clarke’s] Scheme of deducing them from Self-Love, which seem’d more 
ingenious than any which the Author of the Inquiry ever yet saw in print.  
In light of this passage and of the facts I have described, there can be little 
doubt that Hutcheson was well acquainted with each of Clarke’s replies to 
Hutcheson’s case against egoism. Notably, those replies include the following 
challenge to NB: 
I see no Reason or Foundation for the Expectation of Beneficence or Rewards 
from God, if he do not Delight, or take a Pleasure in doing Good. Without this 
Supposition, I understand not for my part, in what Sense he could be called a 
good Being. The Scripture, it’s certain, represents him, and in very strong Terms, 
as a Being that delights in Mercy and Loving-Kindness; and why we should not 
understand those and the like Expressions literally, I know not. ... No Body 
doubts, I suppose, but he is a very happy Being; and why may not one part of his 
Happiness be thought to consist in a Delight to do Good? I hardly believe, our 
Author will be able to shew any absurd Consequence to follow from such a 
Supposition. (Clarke, pp. 90-91.) 
In Hutcheson’s partial summary of his theological objection (the passage 
starting with “In short”), he had said that because God’s “Interests are 
independent on us,” we have no reason to expect rewards from God unless God 
acts from principles other than self-love. Clarke is here replying that on the 
contrary, we have no reason to expect rewards from God unless God receives 
pleasure from doing good, in which case (we are to infer) self-love is the likely 
motive from which God rewards us. Clarke further claims that God receives 
pleasure from doing good. In claiming this, Clarke is rejecting NB, the premise 
that God does not benefit himself by rewarding the virtuous. 
Clarke sees two reasons for rejecting NB. First, since God is good, he 
surely delights in doing good deeds. These include rewarding the virtuous. 
Second, many biblical passages clash with NB. Many of them imply that God 
receives pleasure from doing good to people. Although Clarke quotes no 
scriptural passages, many could serve his purpose. Consider Jeremiah 32:41 
(RSV): “I will rejoice in doing them good, and I will plant them in this land in 
faithfulness, with all my heart and all my soul.”   
3. 
I now can explain the puzzle about NB. To start, let me say that Clarke’s chal-
lenge to NB is not only plausible but arresting. Hutcheson no doubt intends his 
theological objection for educated religious believers of his place and time, the 
vast majority of whom are Christians. But imagine a Christian reading Clarke’s 
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challenge to NB, having earlier accepted Hutcheson’s theological objection. 
Would this reader not pause and seriously rethink whether NB stands up? Also, 
in anticipation of such readers, would Hutcheson not want to address Clarke’s 
challenge, especially given a convenient opportunity to do so? He had such an 
opportunity when he revised his Inquiry for the third edition. Yet despite the 
respect for Clarke implicit in that edition, neither in that work nor in any other 
did Hutcheson address Clarke’s challenge to NB.15 This is curious as it stands, 
and even more so given that Hutcheson did not remove his theological objec-
tion from the third (or fourth) edition of the Inquiry. The objection appears 
there as I quoted it; yet with nothing added to thwart Clarke’s challenge. 
We thus have a puzzle, which we can express with precision as follows: 
Since Hutcheson intends his theological objection for a primarily Christian 
audience, why does he advance NB without argument, not just in the early 
editions of his Inquiry but also in the editions following the appearance of 
Clarke’s Foundation? Why does he do so, that is, given that NB not only 
invites, but receives at Clarke’s hands, a challenge of a Christian kind—
namely, that NB clashes with Christian scripture and with the tenet that 
God is good? 
This puzzle is not negligible. Some might contend that by ignoring Clarke’s 
challenge to NB, Hutcheson deprives his theological objection of sufficient 
force to persuade his audience.  
A plausible answer to the puzzle is available, though it is not to be found in 
Hutcheson’s Inquiry. More generally, it is not to be found in his strictly 
philosophical tenets. We must consider his theological tenets and, especially, 
the theological assumptions of his place and time.  
4.  
Before I answer the puzzle let me discuss a possibly tempting, but defective, 
answer. It says that in the third edition of the Inquiry, not only does Hutcheson 
retain his theological objection and make no comeback to Clarke’s reply, he 
also does the same with most of his non-theological objections to egoism. In 
other words, for nearly all of them to which Clarke had explicitly or implicitly 
replied, Hutcheson retains them and makes no direct response to Clarke. In 
general, Hutcheson’s method for handling Clarke’s replies is not to discard his 
early objections to egoism, but simply to add new ones that sidestep the 
replies.16 So it is really no puzzle—or no special puzzle—that Hutcheson 
                                                                  
15 Regarding the implicit respect for Clarke: The third edition of the Inquiry contains many revisions 
in response to Clarke’s critique of the second edition. See Turco, pp. 87-89.  
16 For instance, consider the objections to egoism in the following pages of IBV2: 146-47 (“Do we 
only love the Beneficent .... Now this is plainly impossible”); 147 (“Or can any one say .... which is indeed 
pretty common”); 153 (“If our sole Intention .... as fear of Danger, overballances it”); 155-56 (“An honest 
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retains his theological objection and leaves Clarke’s challenge to it unanswered. 
This action is part of a general procedure; it is not confined to just one 
objection. 
In responding to this answer I must speak just as generally and as 
abstractly as the answer itself. Space requires this, given the variety of 
Hutcheson’s objections and Clarke’s replies. 
Consider the following theses:  
1. Our affectionate feelings for others (for instance, for those who have 
been generous to us) arise from our belief that by having those 
feelings we can benefit ourselves.   
2. Our desire to make others happy arises from our belief that by having 
that desire we can benefit ourselves.   
3. Our desire to make others happy arises from our belief that by having 
that desire, or that by achieving its object, we can receive money, 
favors, material goods and the like. 
4. Our desire to make others happy arises from our belief that by 
achieving the object of that desire—that is, by making others 
happy—we can somehow benefit ourselves. For one thing, we can 
receive the pleasure that humans naturally and directly derive from 
seeing others happy. 
These theses are distinct. Arguably, however, Hutcheson did not see the 
distinctions clearly in the early editions of his Inquiry. He later did so partly 
because, in general, Clarke’s comments on Hutcheson’s non-theological 
objections to egoism reduce to this point: Although those objections may refute 
one or more of the first three theses, they do not touch thesis 4, which 
represents psychological egoism (or the egoist’s account of benevolence) much 
better than do the other three.17 In the third edition of the Inquiry Hutcheson 
tries to overcome this point, though generally not by discarding or significantly 
revising his early non-theological objections to egoism. Rather, he supplements 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Farmer will tell you .... this Love then must be disinterested”); and 158-59 (“And that this is so in fact .... 
and we should delight in their Happiness”). These objections reappear in IBV3 154-55, 155, 146, 159-60, 
161-63. Hutcheson then supplements them with new objections that circumvent Clarke’s earlier replies. 
See IBV3 145-47. 
17 For example, to the objection in IBV2 146-47 (“Do we only love the Beneficent ...”), Clarke makes 
three replies. They appear in Clarke, pp. 78-80, 82-84, 87-88. (The third also appears in Clarke, pp. 81-
82.) The first reply essentially argues that Hutcheson’s objection runs afoul of the distinction between 
thesis 1 and the remaining three theses. The second and third replies, together, essentially contend that 
Hutcheson’s objection overlooks the distinction between theses 2 and 3 on the one hand, and thesis 4 on 
the other. Collectively, the three replies purport to show that even if Hutcheson’s objection refutes theses 
1, 2, and 3, it leaves 4 unscathed.  
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them with new objections that target thesis 4.18 Those new objections identify 
various desires for the happiness of others—for instance, for our family’s 
happiness after our death—which, Hutcheson believes, thesis 4 cannot 
plausibly explain. To explain them, he thinks, we must postulate fundamental, 
benevolent desires. This is the same style of argument we find in his early non-
theological objections, only now it aims clearly at thesis 4.  
 Given these facts, it is no surprise that in the third edition of his Inquiry, 
Hutcheson retains many of his early non-theological objections to egoism and 
makes no direct response to Clarke’s replies. Charitably interpreted, Hutcheson 
does this on the grounds—undisputed by Clarke—that those non-theological 
objections refute one or more of the first three theses, which some egoists may 
hold. In fact, Hutcheson clearly takes theses 3 and 4 to reflect the only 
promising “ways in which some may deduce Benevolence from Self-Love,” and 
apparently sees 3 as vulnerable to many of his early non-theological 
objections.19   
However, the grounds just mentioned have no relevance to Hutcheson’s 
theological objection. They fail to explain why he retains that objection and 
makes no comeback to Clarke’s reply. This is because Hutcheson’s theological 
objection does not address any of the above four theses. (At least, it does not do 
so except remotely, by challenging psychological egoism.) Nor does Clarke’s 
reply to it claim that it leaves thesis 4 untouched. The issue in this case is not 
what best explains a human desire or feeling—that is, whether the desire or 
feeling arises according to one of the four theses listed above, or instead springs 
from fundamental benevolence. Rather, the issue is simply whether NB, the 
premise that God does not benefit himself by rewarding the virtuous, is true. So 
even after we read Hutcheson’s new objections to psychological egoism—or 
more generally, read his revisions and additions in the third edition of his 
Inquiry—we are left with our earlier question: Why does Hutcheson advance 
NB without argument, and continue to do so even after Clarke’s challenge to it. 
As yet we have no answer to this question. I provide one in the next section.  
5.  
Let me first say that my answer is somewhat speculative. Seldom can we be 
certain of an author’s unstated aims and assumptions. Even so, my answer is 
plausible. It has five parts: 
First, Hutcheson reasonably assumes, and takes his readers to assume, that 
to say that God does not benefit himself by rewarding the virtuous (that it is not 
“for the Advantage of the Deity to do so”) is to say that God does not increase 
                                                                  
18 IBV3 145-47. Thesis 4 is what Hutcheson means by Clarke’s “Scheme of deducing them [disinter-
ested affections] from Self-Love,” which to Hutcheson is “more ingenious” than any other extant scheme 
of that kind. See, in section 2, the block quotation from Hutcheson’s Essay. 
19 See IBV3 137-44, 154-55, 155, 146, 161-63. (The quoted phrase is on page 137.)  
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his happiness (pleasure, well-being) by rewarding them. Hutcheson also 
reasonably assumes that although the word “increase” does not appear in 
Clarke’s challenge to NB, Clarke’s main point—or what readers would 
naturally see as that point—is that God’s happiness increases as a result of 
making the virtuous happy. For Clarke maintains that we should take “literally” 
the scriptural passages which say that God delights, takes pleasure, in doing 
good. Just as important, Clarke does this in opposition to Hutcheson’s view that 
God reaps no advantage from rewarding the virtuous, that God’s “Interests are 
independent on us.” From what Clarke says, and from its context, a natural 
reading of his point is that God’s happiness can increase. It can do so through 
an increase in the happiness of virtuous people. 
Second, Hutcheson thinks that owing to God’s attributes, God cannot 
increase his happiness through an increase in the happiness of virtuous people. 
Hutcheson believes that God’s simplicity, immutability, and perfection rule out 
changes in God’s emotions. Consider this passage from Hutcheson’s Synopsis 
of Metaphysics: 
The virtues or perfections of God are infinite ... and ... he is endowed with every 
true and pure perfection. ... God is a simple nature without parts .... The perfec-
tions of God are not therefore adventitious but are all necessarily connected with 
the divine nature from the beginning. He is therefore immutable .... There are no 
violent emotions in God, analogous to human passions .... Although God is held 
to delight in external events, especially in the best and happiest state of the world, 
the divine happiness is not therefore made uncertain, precarious, or dependent on 
external things, since all external things and their entire condition depend upon 
his most powerful self. ... There seems to be nothing that the most blessed God 
could seek as a result of self-love that would increase his happiness. ... All inten-
tions for his own actions seem to emanate rather from his unwavering benevo-
lence and his natural and unchangeable will to share his felicity with others.20  
Note the sentence, “There seems to be nothing that the most blessed God could 
seek as a result of self-love that would increase his happiness.” This, in 
essence, is a generalized version of NB, assuming the equivalence between 
benefitting oneself and increasing one’s happiness. And although the sentence 
does not begin with “therefore,” it receives support from what precedes it. For 
what precedes it, among other things, is the view that God’s emotional life 
differs entirely from ours. First, God has no violent emotions, nothing akin to 
human passions. Second, although God is “held to” delight in external events, 
his perfect delight or pleasure does not depend on such events. It is not affected 
by, does not rise or fall with, such things as an increase in our happiness. Third, 
                                                                  
20 Francis Hutcheson, Synopsis of Metaphysics (1742), in Francis Hutcheson, Logic, Metaphysics, and 
the Natural Sociability of Mankind, ed. James Moore and Michael Silverthorne, trans. Michael 
Silverthorne (Indianapolis IN: Liberty Fund, 2006), pp. 57-187, at pp. 164, 165, 173. In his introduction to 
this work (p. xxiii), James Moore says that “it seems most probable that Hutcheson composed [it] in the 
1720s.”  
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God is immutable in his perfections, including, presumably, his perfect 
happiness. 
In short, the nature and quality of God’s emotional life, and hence God’s 
happiness, is unchanging and unaffected by things external to him. Indeed, 
being immutable, it is unaffected even by things internal to him or done by him.  
This thesis is not original with Hutcheson. It is the age-old doctrine of 
divine impassibility.21 This brings me to the third part of my answer, namely, 
that this doctrine was orthodox among Christians of Hutcheson’s time. Indeed, 
it was orthodox until a little over a century ago, when various theologians 
began a debate over it that continues today.22 As Thomas Weinandy observes, 
“from the dawn of the Patristic period [until ‘toward the end of the nineteenth 
century’] Christian theology has held as axiomatic that God is impassible—that 
is, He does not undergo emotional changes of state, and so cannot suffer.”23 
Other scholars agree. Paul Helm, for instance, observes that “the classic 
Christian tradition, as well as that of the Reformation, including Calvin, and 
that of the Westminster Confession, affirms God’s impassibility.”24 And 
Marshall Randles, writing in 1900, says that “since patristic times, it [divine 
impassibility] has been taken for granted in the theology of the great ecclesias-
tical denominations.”25    
But not to rest the point merely on secondary sources, let me quote a 
representative, primary source from Hutcheson’s time. The following is from 
William Beveridge (1637–1708), theologian and bishop of St. Asaph. 
[God is] without Passions ...; that is, not subject to, nor capable of, those Passions 
of love, joy, hatred, grief, anger, and the like, as they daily arise in us imperfect 
Creatures; but he is always the same unmoveable, unchangeable, impassible God: 
And therefore in all our Contemplations of his divine Essence, we are not to 
conceive of him, as One passionately rejoycing in, or greiving for any thing 
                                                                  
21 This doctrine is the subject of a vast contemporary literature. Predictably, definitions of it not only 
abound but also vary. I especially like this one: “DDI asserts that God does not experience emotional 
changes either from within or effected by his relationship to creation. He is not changed from within or 
without; he remains unchanged and unchanging both prior and subsequent to creation” (Theology 
Committee of the Association of Reformed Baptist Churches of America, “A Position Paper Concerning 
the Doctrine of Divine Impassibility,” <http://arbca.com/divine-impassibility-section-1>, April 15, 2015). 
For further representative definitions see Marcel Sarot, God, Passibility and Corporeality (Kampen: Kok 
Pharos, 1992), p. 30; and T. G. Weinandy, “Impassibility of God,” New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. 
(Detroit MI: Thomson/Gale, 2003), vol. 7: 357-60, at 357.  
22 Useful recent discussions of the debate, each with many references, include Thomas G. Weinandy, 
Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 2000); Rob Lister, God Is Impassible and 
Impassioned: Toward a Theology of Divine Emotion (Wheaton IL: Crossway, 2012); and Anastasia 
Scrutton, “Divine Passibility: God and Emotion,” Philosophy Compass 8 (2013): 866-74.  
23 Thomas Weinandy, “Does God Suffer?,” First Things 117 (2001): 35-41, at 35.  
24 Paul Helm, “B. B. Warfield on Divine Passion,” Westminster Theological Journal 69 (2007): 95-
104, at 95. 
25 Marshall Randles, Blessed God, Impassibility (London UK: Charles H. Kelly, 1900), p. 8.  
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whatsoever, as we do, but as a pure and perfect Essence, as without Body and 
without Parts, so without Passions too; and such Contemplations as these are, 
both Scripture and Reason will give us warrant for. ... [For instance,] it is 
impossible there should be any motion or mutation in God; for inconstancy and 
mutability are imperfections .... Again, if God should be mov’d or chang’d, he 
must be chang’d either from better to worse, from worse to better, or from equal 
to equal .... [in which case]  he would not be God absolutely perfect.26   
Beveridge is not saying that we speak falsely if we attribute love, anger and the 
like to God, but rather that God does not experience such emotions “as they 
daily arise in us imperfect Creatures.” For as they arise in such creatures, they 
involve fluctuations, motions, mutability. Beveridge’s emphasis is on the 
unchangeable nature of God’s inner life. 
Note that Beveridge believes not just that God is impassible, but that God 
is impassible owing to his other attributes, such as his simplicity (he is “without 
Parts”), perfection, and immutability. This belief has traditionally gone hand-
in-hand with the impassibility doctrine. It was no less orthodox in Hutcheson’s 
day than the impassibility doctrine itself.27  
In the quoted passage, Beveridge is explaining the first of the Thirty-Nine 
Articles of Religion (1562–63), the doctrinal statement of the Church of 
England.28 Specifically, he is explaining part of its first sentence: “There is but 
one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions.” Similar 
words appear in the Westminster Confession of Faith (1646), a key doctrinal 
statement of Calvinist Christianity.29 Its second chapter begins thus: “There is 
but one only living and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a most 
pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions, immutable.” It is 
generally thought, and was thought in Hutcheson’s day, that the doctrine of 
God’s impassibility is implicit in these passages. Helm makes this point in the 
statement I quoted from him; the same point is made by many others.30   
The fourth part of my answer is that the impassibility doctrine implies that 
when we encounter biblical passages which, on the surface, suggest emotional 
                                                                  
26 William Beveridge, An Exposition of the XXXIX Articles of the Church of England. Article the First 
(Oxford UK: R. Smith, 1710), pp. 15, 18. Similar statements appear in other works of this period. A 
pristine example is William Nicholls, A Commentary On the First Fifteen, and Part of the Sixteenth, 
Articles of the Church of England (London UK: n.p., 1712), p. 10 note f.  
27 For illustrations in addition to the passage from Beveridge, see Nicholls, p. 10 note f; Gilbert 
Burnet, An Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, 3rd ed. (London UK: 
Chiswell, 1705), p. 27; and the earlier quotation from Hutcheson’s Synopsis of Metaphysics. 
28 Widely available, e.g., at <http://www.reseminary.edu/files/39articles.pdf>. 
29 Widely available, e.g., at <http://www.reformed.org/documents/wcf_with_proofs/>. Similar words 
appear in several other confessional documents, such as the Irish Articles of 1615 and the Savoy Declara-
tion of 1658. See Samuel Renihan, ed., God without Passions: A Reader (Palmdale CA: Reformed Baptist 
Academic Press, 2015), ch. 6. 
30 See, e.g., Warren McWilliams, The Passion of God (Macon GA: Mercer Univ. Press, 1985), p. 14; 
J. K. Mozley, The Impassibility of God (Cambridge UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1926), p. 126.  
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change in God, we must interpret them figuratively—that is, in a way that 
implies no changes in God’s inner life. This observation is common in our day, 
and was equally common in Hutcheson’s.31 For example, does God rejoice and 
grieve? Beveridge would say yes, but only if those words “denote something in 
him [God], which we cannot apprehend, but by the dark Resemblance, that 
these Passions [human joy and grief] have unto it.”32 William Nicholls (1664–
1712), another defender of the impassibility doctrine, would also say yes, but 
add that “we must understand these Expressions as being Condescensions made 
to our Capacities, and are only Representations of the [immutable] Tendencies 
of the Divine Will, by the Idea we have of our own Inclinations.”33 Finally, to 
give a helpful contemporary example, Thomas Weinandy would say yes, but 
caution that this  
is not to denote an emotional change within God, but rather to accentuate his 
unchangeable and all-consuming love. ... Such references to God’s emotional 
changes of state are not then expressions of God actually experiencing first 
pleasure and then sorrow, or joy and then suffering; rather, they express the 
reality of his unchanging love which is experienced differently depending upon 
historical situations and circumstances.34  
I do not claim that this stance on biblical interpretation, this injunction to read 
figuratively such passages as Jeremiah 32:41, brings no unclarities or difficul-
ties. My point about it is that it has long been regarded, reasonably, as an 
upshot of the doctrine of divine impassibility.  
The fifth part of my answer derives from the previous four. It relates them 
to the puzzle about NB, the premise that God does not benefit himself from 
rewarding the virtuous. Firstly, in the early editions of his Inquiry, why does 
Hutcheson advance NB without argument? The answer, I believe, is that he 
intends his theological objection for educated Christians, mainly those of a 
typical, or orthodox, sort. He reasonably assumes that they will accept NB 
without argument, regarding it as an upshot of divine impassibility. 
Secondly, in the editions of the Inquiry following the publication of 
Clarke’s Foundation, why does Hutcheson continue to advance NB without 
argument, ignoring Clarke’s challenge to NB? The answer, I believe, is that on 
a natural reading, Clarke’s challenge amounts to an undefended denial that 
God’s major attributes make God impassible, and an equally undefended denial 
                                                                  
31 In addition to the quotations below, see Helm, p. 95; Burnet, p. 27; and Mark Smith, “‘Only the 
Non-Suffering God Can Help’: Recovering the Glory of Divine Impassibility,” Churchman 126 (2012): 
147-62, at 149, 150-51. See Renihan for an excellent collection of original sources on this matter, many 
from Hutcheson’s time.  
32 Beveridge, pp. 16-17.  
33 Nicholls, p. 10 note f.  
34 Weinandy, “Impassibility of God,” p. 358. 
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that given God’s impassibility, we must read many biblical passages 
figuratively.  
Recall, for example, that Clarke’s main point—or what naturally appears 
as that point—is that God’s happiness can change, that it increases when God 
makes the virtuous happy. To say this of God is to deny that God’s main 
attributes make him impassible. It is thus to deny a position which, in the minds 
of Hutcheson’s intended audience, has immense support, including a 
preponderance of theological authority.  
Of course, to deny that position is not out of line, given a plausible 
argument for doing so. But Clarke’s challenge to NB includes no such 
argument. It includes such claims as that Clarke “know[s] not” why certain 
biblical passages, those that depict God as delighting in mercy, should not be 
taken literally. It would be a long stretch, however, to consider such claims 
arguments, as opposed to mere professions of how Clarke sees things. Very 
likely, then, Hutcheson feels no need or duty to answer Clarke’s challenge. 
That he is silent about it is unsurprising.  
I believe I have answered charitably and plausibly (even if somewhat 
speculatively) the puzzle about NB, Hutcheson’s premise that God does not 
benefit himself by rewarding the virtuous. Given the facts I have presented, it is 
understandable that Hutcheson advances NB without argument, and continues 
to do so even after Clarke’s challenge to it.  
In saying this, I am not faulting Clarke for his challenge. I can think of 
feasible ways to interpret Clarke charitably, the boldest of which sees him as 
holding the impassibility doctrine and believing that his words somehow 
comport with it. But the most obvious way is to read him as rejecting the 
impassibility doctrine and expecting some of his readers to do likewise—or at 
least to do likewise upon reading his challenge. After all, in our own time, even 
if not in Clarke’s, many expert theologians—Anglican, Presbyterian, Roman 
Catholic, and so on—reject the doctrine of divine impassibility.35 Also, they 
often do so on grounds that stem from no facts or theories unavailable in 
Clarke’s time.36 So perhaps Clarke rejects the doctrine on similar grounds, and 
expects at least a few of his Christian readers to do likewise. I find no explicit 
evidence of this in his writings, but nor do I find evidence against it. 
Additionally, I find nothing odd in the idea that Clarke would pen a 
challenge to NB likely to convince only a few Christian readers. Clarke regards 
                                                                  
35 For extensive lists of such theologians, see Lister, ch. 5; Weinandy, “Does God Suffer?,” p. 35; and 
Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, ch. 1.  
36 Note that I say “often,” not “always.” Some prominent defenses of divine passibility derive from 
twentieth-century process theology or reflections on the Holocaust. (For useful discussion, including many 
references, see Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, pp. 2-6, 19-25.) Others, however, including scriptural and 
philosophical defenses, are not crucially tied to things that come after Clarke’s time. See Lister, ch. 5; 
Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, pp. 6-19; and Richard E. Creel, “Immutability and Impassibility” in Charles 
Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn, eds., A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed. 
(Malden MA: Blackwell, 2010), pp. 322-28, at p. 324.  
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Hutcheson’s moral theory, including its critique of egoism, as harmful to 
Christianity—indeed, as a possible “Occasion to the Enemies of Christianity, to 
Triumph and Ridicule it.”37 So it is no surprise that Clarke, a Christian, would 
reach for most any argument that might persuade Christian readers, even if just 
a few, to reject Hutcheson’s philosophy. 
Finally, the things just said are consistent with my answer to the puzzle 
about NB. We can read Clarke charitably and still maintain, plausibly, that to 
the great majority of educated Christians in Hutcheson’s day, Clarke’s 
challenge to NB would seem a undefended denial of a soundly supported 
doctrine. This makes it unsurprising, even if not inevitable, that Hutcheson 
would ignore Clarke’s challenge. Few philosophers reply to every challenge 
their arguments receive. The challenges likely to be ignored include those that 
appeal to no sizeable audience.  
6.  
My discussion thus far may raise a question. Allow me to discuss it briefly 
before concluding. 
Earlier I mentioned a practice of reading figuratively certain biblical 
passages—those that suggest that God’s emotions can change. A similar point 
goes for passages that suggest that God has desires. We find a long tradition of 
reading them figuratively, on the grounds that God’s “desires” can be nothing 
like the mutable, human psychological states that we strictly mean by desires. 
Also, this tradition was orthodox among Christians of Hutcheson’s era.38   
These facts suggest a new challenge to Hutcheson’s theological objection, 
“new” in that it differs from Clarke’s. It concerns the following of Hutcheson’s 
premises: 
If it is reasonable to think that God has fundamental desires for the 
happiness of others, it is reasonable to think that we humans are capable of 
such desires. 
Although Hutcheson does not word the premise exactly this way—for instance, 
he uses the words “loves” and “dispositions” rather than “desires”—he clearly 
holds it.39 And the challenge to it is that because God has desires only 
                                                                  
37 Clarke, p. 107. Hutcheson’s critique of psychological egoism supports, indirectly at least, his view 
that benevolence is the essence of moral virtue. Clarke considers that view greatly at odds with 
Christianity. It implies that to act from hope of divine reward is not virtuous. See Clarke, pp. 48-50, 105-
112. 
38 See Renihan, both the sources he includes and his introduction, especially pp. 21-34.  
39 In mentioning the words “loves” and “dispositions” I am looking at my quotation (in section 2) of 
Hutcheson’s theological objection—at the penultimate sentence in its first paragraph. I say that Hutcheson 
“clearly holds” the premise stated above because the target of his theological objection is psychological 
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figuratively, the consequent of the premise receives no support from the 
antecedent. The consequent, after all, concerns human desires; the antecedent 
concerns divine ones.  
This new challenge leads to the following question about Hutcheson’s 
theological objection: Given that the new challenge reflects Christian 
orthodoxy, and that Hutcheson is writing for educated Christians, why does he 
advance the above premise without argument?  
A plausible answer is available. Firstly, among Christians of Hutcheson’s 
place and time, the familiar Calvinist view that human nature is totally corrupt, 
and thus indescribably different from God’s nature, was not quite as prevalent 
as it had been many decades earlier. A more moderate view had gained ground, 
partly owing to the writings of the seventeenth-century latitudinarians, 
especially the Cambridge Platonists.40 According to this view, although our 
nature is indeed terribly fallen, we are God-like to some degree, or at least 
capable of being so. This view turns up commonly in the religious literature of 
Hutcheson’s day: 
As Corrupt as our Nature is, we have nothing Substantial in us but what is Good, 
and a great deal that is Excellent, being made in the Image and Likeness of God, 
which still in great Measure shines forth in us.41  
Of that Image of God, in which Mankind was Originally created, ... there remains 
a plain Tract, and many Foot-steps may still be discerned. ... Mankind is not so 
wholly degenerated from his Original Excellency ... There are yet left some Seeds 
of Grace in our Souls, which if cultivated and improved; the Image of God will be 
daily renewed in us; we shall increase in Vertue, and grow more and more like 
God.42 
                                                                                                                                                                              
egoism, which, as Hutcheson knows, is a thesis about desires. See the first sentence in my quotation of 
Hutcheson’s theological objection. See also IBV2 138; IBV3 133, 137-41, 147-48, 151. 
40 Edifying discussion of this point is in Gill; also in Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A 
Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660–1780. Volume I: Whichcote to Wesley 
(Cambridge UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991), chs. 1 and 2. The latitudinarians were members of the 
Church of England, virtually all of them clergymen, who shared a cluster of tenets that proves difficult to 
define. The following definition is representative: “The term ‘latitudinarianism’ generally signals a broad 
churchmanship, willing to accommodate some degree of doctrinal and liturgical heterogeneity in pursuit 
of a common ground of popular Protestantism, anti-Calvinist moral theology, and what was sometimes 
called ‘reasonable’ Christianity” (Brent S. Sirota, The Christian Monitors: The Church of England and the 
Age of Benevolence, 1680-1730 [New Haven CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2014], p. 20). The Cambridge 
Platonists, generally seen as the first generation (or else the forerunners) of the latitudinarians, include 
Benjamin Whichcote (1609–83), Henry More (1614–87), and Ralph Cudworth (1617–88) as key figures. 
Other notable latitudinarians include John Wilkins (1614–72), Isaac Barrow (1630–77), John Tillotson 
(1630–94), and Joseph Glanvill (1636–1680).  
41 John Norris, A Practical Treatise Concerning Humility (London UK: S. Manship, 1707), p. 25. 
42 Lewis Atterbury, Twelve Practical Discourses on Several Subjects (London UK: T. Warner, 1720), 
pp. 181-82. 
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We are not capable of being very like God, in his Omniscience, or his Almighty 
Power, but we are very capable of being like him in his Goodness.43  
No man is really despicable. ... Every man living hath stamped on him the 
venerable image of his glorious maker, which nothing incident to him can utterly 
deface. ... Every man is of a divine extraction, and allied to heaven by nature and 
by grace; as the son of God, and the brother of God incarnate.44  
Secondly, it is fair to assume that Hutcheson is writing for those who accept the 
moderate view just mentioned. In other words, he intends his theological 
objection for readers who grant a significant, even if distant, similarity between 
human and divine nature. He thus expects them to grant that if God can 
nonselfishly act for the good of others, a presumption exists that humans can do 
the same, even if their motives only remotely resemble what actuates God. 
But to grant this is to grant the essence of the premise mentioned shortly 
ago. I mean the premise that if it is reasonable to think that God has 
fundamental desires for the happiness of others, it is reasonable to think that we 
humans are capable of such desires. Fairly interpreted, this premise is not so 
much about psychological states as about the similarity, distant but still signifi-
cant, between God’s actuating principles and those that actuate humans. 
Hutcheson assumes, I believe, that because many of his readers grant this 
similarity, they will find his premise agreeable. This is why he advances that 
premise without argument. 
Clearly, I am speculating to some extent—a measure of speculation is 
unavoidable here. Even so, I have offered a plausible and charitable answer to 
the question raised in this section. It resembles my answer to our earlier puzzle 
about NB, the premise that God receives no benefit from rewarding the 
virtuous. Both answers refer to theological currents of Hutcheson’s time and 
place. What comes to light from these answers is that given the readers for 
whom Hutcheson is likely writing, his theological objection has considerable 
force. It employs premises acceptable to his audience, and plausibly deploys 
them against psychological egoism.  
7. 
Although it is trite, it is also true, that when interpreting a philosopher a 
common mistake is that of reading the philosopher out of context, with the 
likely result that one draws an uncharitable conclusion. The uncharitable 
conclusion in this case would be that by asserting NB without argument, not 
                                                                  
43 John Adams, A Sermon Preach’d before the Queen at Windsor, September 14. 1707 (London UK: 
H. Hills, 1709), pp. 9-10. 
44 Isaac Barrow, The Works Of the Learned Isaac Barrow, D. D., 3 vols, ed. John Tillotson (London 
UK: James Round, et al., [1683–86] 1716), vol. 1: 255. 
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only before but after Clarke’s challenge to it, Hutcheson errs in a way that ruins 
his theological objection to egoism. 
This interpretive mistake is indeed common. And the best way to avoid it 
is simply to resist falling into it, that is, to attend to such things as the intellec-
tual setting—philosophical, theological, and so on—in which the philosopher is 
writing. To do so in the present case is to see that very likely, Hutcheson’s 
assertion of NB without argument represents no error, but rather a reasonable 
confidence that even despite Clarke’s challenge, Hutcheson’s intended readers 
will accept NB. This, in turn, reflects a sensitivity to theological assumptions of 
Hutcheson’s place and time. These facts not only protect Hutcheson from an 
uncharitable charge, but remind us of the crucial importance of context to the 
study of the history of philosophy.45 
 
                                                                  
45 I am grateful for comments and suggestions from anonymous reviewers and from Chad Carmichael, 
Thomas J. Davis, Jason T. Eberl, Samuel Kahn, and William J. Wainwright.  
